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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
DAVID ROGER MARKLAND,

CaseNo.20020965-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(d) (2002), where this appeal is from an interlocutory order entered in a
criminal case. Appellant David Roger Markland petitioned for appeal from an interlocutory order of the trial court, dated October 28, 2002. This Court granted the petition
on December 17, 2002. (R. 107.) A copy of the trial court's October 28, 2002 order is
attached as Addendum A, and a copy of this Court's December 17 Order granting the
petition for permission to appeal from an interlocutory order is attached as Addendum B.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issue presented for review is as follows: Whether the trial court erred in
denying defendant's motion to suppress where the sheriffs deputies engaged in a
level-two detention without the requisite reasonable articulable suspicion.
Standard of Review: The standard applicable is as follows: "The determination of
whether an encounter with law enforcement officers constitutes a seizure under the Fourth

Amendment... is a legal conclusion that we review for correctness." State v. Topanotes,
2000 UT App 311,1f4, 14 P.3d 695 (citing Salt Lake Citv v. Rav. 2000 UT App 55, % 8,
998 P.2d 274), cerl granted on other grounds. 29 P.3d 1 (Utah 2001). Also, "whether a
particular set of facts gives rise to reasonable suspicion is a question of law, which is
reviewed for correctness." State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 450 (Utah 1996).
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT
The issue is preserved in the record on appeal at 63-70, 110, and 111.
RULES. STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following constitutional provision will be determinative of the issue on
appeal: U.S. Const, amend. IV. The text of that provision is contained in Addendum C.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, Disposition in the Court Below.
On May 9, 2001, the state charged Markland with one count of drug possession, a
third-degree-felony offense, and one count of drug possession, a misdemeanor offense,
under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (2002). (R. 3-4.) On July 11, 2002, after a
mental competency determination and a preliminary hearing, the trial court bound
Markland over on the charges. (See R. 40, 42-52.) On August 16, 2002, the defense
moved to suppress evidence obtained during a warrantless search. (R. 63-70.) The trial
court held an evidentiary hearing on the matter and denied the motion. (R. 110 and 111;
78-80.) A copy of the trial court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and order
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(dated October 28, 2002) is attached hereto as Addendum A. Thereafter, the defense
petitioned for interlocutory appeal. This Court granted the petition on December 17,
2002. (R. 107.) A copy of this Court's order is attached as Addendum B.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 30, 2001, Deputy Spotten received a call from dispatch at 3:14 a.m. that
somebody was "screaming or crying out for help." (R. I l l :3.) The cries supposedly
came from the east end of the "Bridgeside Landing Complex" located at approximately
4517 South Bridgeside Way (500 West), Taylorsville. (R. 111:3, 10.) The deputy
roughly described the area as follows: the entryway to the complex is off Sunstone Road.
(R. 111:3-4.) A main road through the complex comes to a dead end at the east end of
the complex. (Id) Spotten described a gated and locked entrance to a bike path, and
open basketball courts on the side of the road near the dead end. (See R. 111:4-5.) He
also described a wooded area and the Jordan River near the basketball courts. (R. I l l :4.)
Spotten testified that it took him five minutes to reach the Bridgestone Landing
Complex after he received the dispatch call. (R. I l l :5.) When Spotten arrived in the
area it was dark. (R. 111:8.) He saw Markland walking in the road toward the dead end,
carrying a couple of over-the-shoulder cloth bags. (R. 111:6, 8.) Spotten got out of his
patrol car, approached Markland, and "asked him if he'd heard anything" in the area.
Markland replied that "he had not." (R. 111:7.)
Spotten then "further detain[ed]" Markland by requesting identification. (R.
111:8-9.) When Markland produced an identification card Spotten "checked through
3

dispatch and ran [Markland — ] to find out what kind of history he may have had, what
kind of involvements, and to check him for warrants also." (R. I l l :9.) Spotten told
Markland that he "needed to run some checks." (R. I l l :9.)
During the checks, Spotten discovered a warrant for Markland's arrest. Spotten
arrested Markland and conducted a search. He discovered drugs, giving rise to the
charges in this case. (R. 3-4; 111:10.)
According to Spotten, Markland was on his way home when he was stopped. The
deputy recalled that Markland said he lived in the area of 13th East, which would be
consistent with the fact that Markland was on the road at the east end of the complex. (R.
111:3-6, 10.) The deputy stated he was "not sure exactly" how Markland would get
home based on the dead-end road. (R. I l l : 12; 49.) The deputy did not say whether a
person could continue past the dead-end on foot, and he did not describe the area beyond
the open basketball courts or the wooded area near the courts. (Record in general.)1

1
Spotten did not explain what he meant when he said he was "not sure exactly
how" Markland would get home "based on the dead-end road." (R. 111:11-13.) Instead,
Spotten testified that Markland could not access a walkway/path near the road because it
was gated/blocked off. (R. 111:12.) Spotten did not indicate whether Markland could
continue on the road on foot past the dead end or through the open basketball courts.
At the preliminary hearing, Spotten testified that the dead-end road "used to be"
an entrance for traffic to the complex from 4500 South. (R. 48-49.) Now the road is
blocked to traffic. (Id.) Spotten testified that he encountered Markland walking in the
middle of the road toward the blocked-off area toward a "gate that's closed" near the road
(R. 49). The gate is an entrance "to the bike path, which was locked at the time." (Id.)
There is no indication that the dead-end was "gated off."
Thus, based on this record, the walkway/path near the road was inaccessible to
pedestrians (gated/locked), and the road was inaccessible to cars (blocked off). The
basketball courts and wooded area apparently were not gated/blocked off. (R. I l l :4-5.)
4

During the motion to suppress hearing, both parties and the trial court made
reference to the preliminary hearing transcript (see R. 111:1-2, 10-11), and that transcript
was filed with the court. (R. 42-52.) The preliminary hearing transcript clarified the
deputy's testimony in relevant respects. Specifically, the deputy testified that when he
received the dispatch call for somebody crying out, he did not know what it was. He
described it as a "[k]ind of suspicious circumstance[s] call." (R. 44.) Spotten did not
say that he considered the "suspicious circumstance [s]" to constitute criminal activity.
(See 42-52 and 111, generally.)
Also, Spotten responded to the dispatch call with another deputy. (R. 51.) When
Spotten took Markland's identification and ran it for warrants, the other deputy stood
with Markland. (R. 51.) After the deputies arrested Markland, they discovered
controlled substances in Markland's jacket and in one of the bags. (R. 47.)
The trial court ruled that the stop constituted a level-two detention. It also found
reasonable suspicion to support the stop. This interlocutory appeal followed.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court ruled that the deputies' conduct here constituted a level-two
detention. Such a detention is justified if an officer articulates objective facts to support
a reasonable suspicion that defendant is engaged in criminal activity.
Here, Deputy Spotten failed to identify a reasonable suspicion to justify a
detention at any time during the encounter with Markland. In fact, the deputy failed to
identify "suspicious" criminal activity of any nature in this case. The level-two detention
5

was unlawful. Consequently, the related arrest and search incident thereto cannot be
upheld. The trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress, as further set forth below.
ARGUMENT
THE SEARCH WAS CONDUCTED IN CONNECTION WITH AN
UNLAWFUL DETENTION, WHERE THE DEPUTY FAILED TO
ARTICULATE REASONABLE SUSPICION.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution is applicable to the
states via the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment provides the following:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const, amend. IV. Unless a governmental agency has secured a valid warrant to
conduct a search, the search is presumptively unlawful, "subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Katzv. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 357
(1967); State v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973, 976 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quoting State v.
Holmes. 774 P.2d 506, 510 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)).
Here, the trial court justified the search as incident to arrest. (R. 79, Finding 16.)
It found that the deputies engaged in a "level-two stop" and ran a warrants check on
Markland. In connection therewith, the deputies arrested and searched him. (R. 79.)
Markland does not dispute that the deputies engaged in a level-two detention.
(See infra, subpoint A.I., below.) Rather, Markland maintains the detention was illegal.
Deputy Spotten failed to articulate reasonable suspicion to support the level-two deten-
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tion. (See infra, subpoint A.2., below.) Where the deputies unlawfully seized Markland,
they were not justified in running the warrants check, and the arrest and search in
connection therewith cannot be upheld. (See infra, subpoint B., below.) Markland
requests that this Court reverse the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress, where
the state failed to establish reasonable suspicion to support the level-two stop.
A. THE TRIAL COURT RULED THAT THE DEPUTIES WERE ENGAGED
IN A LEVEL-TWO DETENTION. UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE.
SUCH A DETENTION WAS UNLAWFUL.
1. The Trial Court Found that the Deputies in this Case Seized Markland.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and its progeny recognize three levels of policecitizen encounters. This Court has described the levels as follows:
The first level occurs when an officer approaches and questions a suspect. An
officer may stop and question a person at any time so long as that person "is not
detained against his [or her] will." Id. The next level is reached when an officer
temporarily seizes a person. In order to legally effect a temporary seizure, the
officer must have "articulable suspicion" that the suspect has or is about to commit
a crime, and the detention must be limited in scope. Id. The third level is arrest,
which requires probable cause for the officer to believe that a crime has been or is
about to be committed. Id.
Salt Lake City v. Smoot 921 P.2d 1003, 1006 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (citing State v. Munsen, 821 P.2d 13, 15 n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1991), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992));
see Terry, 392 U.S. at 10. Since a level-one encounter is consensual, "there is no seizure
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." State v. Hansen. 2002 UT 125, ^34, 463
Utah Adv. Rep. 5 (cites omitted). Level-two and level-three encounters, however, require
the officer to justify his conduct under Fourth Amendment standards. Id atffl[35-36;see
7

also State v. Truiillo, 739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
In this case, the trial court ruled and the state "concede[d]" that the encounter
"was a level-two stop requiring reasonable articulable suspicion." (R. 79, Conclusion
Tfl.) That Conclusion seems to suggest that from the beginning, the stop was a level-two
detention. (See id) Markland does not dispute that determination.
Under the law, a level-two seizure or detention occurs when a reasonable person,
"in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident," believes he is "not free to
leave." State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 786 (Utah 1991). Utah courts have identified
circumstances that are indicative of a "seizure." For example, if the officer uses physical
force or physically touches the person, if more than one officer is present, if an officer
uses a particular tone of voice or language indicating that compliance is required, if the
officer engages in a show of authority, or if the officer retains possession of defendant's
property during the encounter, each of those instances will support that defendant is
seized. See Ray, 2000 UT App 55,fflfl1. 13; see also Hansen, 2002 UT 125. %4l.
Where the trial court here found that the deputies engaged in a level-two detention
with Markland, the findings may be construed in favor of that determination. State v.
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). The trial court Findings here are as follows.
Finding 1: Spotten [and another deputy] responded to a dispatch that "someone
was crying out for help" at 3:14 a.m. on the east side of the Bridgeside Complex at 4517
South and approximately 500 West. (R. 78; 51; 111:10.) Finding 2: The road at the east
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end of the complex came to a dead end. (R. 78.)
Finding 3: Spotten described a gated/locked bike path, basketball courts and the
Jordan River near the dead end on the side of the road. [Spotten also described a wooded
area]. (R. 78; 48; 111 :4-5.) Finding 4: It was dark; there was no lighting at the end of
the road. (R. 78.) Findings 5 and 6: Spotten [and his partner] arrived at the complex
within 5 minutes of receiving the dispatch call. They saw Markland walking in the middle of the road toward the blocked-off dead end. Markland was carrying two bags. (R.
79; 51.) Finding 7: The deputies saw nothing else in the area. (R. 79.) Findings 8 and
9: Spotten asked Markland if he heard anything in the area, and he asked for Markland's
name. (Id.) Finding 10: Markland responded that he did not hear anything. (Id.)
Finding 11: "Spotten asked [Markland] where he was going." (R. 79.) Finding 12:
Markland "responded that he was going home to 13th East and 45th South." (R. 79.)
Finding 13: The trial court found that "[t]here was no way for the defendant to get
home walking in the direction he was headed when Deputy Spotten stopped him." (R.
79.) The evidence relating to that Finding is as follows: As Markland either walked
toward the dead end in the road (R. I l l :6) or toward the gated path on the side of the
road near the dead-end (R. 49; 111: 12), Spotten drove up to Markland from the only road
for traffic, got out of his car and made contact with Markland. (R. 48-49; 111:7.) Spotten testified that he did not know how Markland would get home "based on the dead end
road." (R. 111:11.) He also testified that Markland could not use a walkway or bike path
because it was gated off and/or locked. (R. 111:12; 111:3-5; but see supra, note 1.)
9

Next, according to Finding 14, Deputy Spotten "asked the defendant for
identification" and he "told [Markland that] he was going to check for warrants." (R.
79.) That finding requires clarification. Pursuant to the marshaled evidence, after
Spotten asked Markland his name, he requested identification. (R. I l l :7-9; 79, Findings
8,14.) Markland provided Spotten with an "i.d." (R. 111:9.) Spotten checked the
identification through dispatch and ran a warrants check while a second deputy stood by
Markland. (R. I l l :9; 51.) Spotten told Markland he "needed to run some checks." (Id.)
Finally, Findings 15 and 16 state that Spotten discovered a warrant for Markland's
arrest, and he discovered controlled substances when he arrested and searched Markland.
(R. 79.) The discovery gave rise to the charges in this case. (R. 3-4.)
According to the Findings and marshaled evidence, the deputies detained
Markland from the beginning. That is, when the deputies stopped Markland in the road,
he was not free to leave.
In Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 74 (1979), officers were cruising in a high crime area
when they observed appellant and another man walking away from each other in an alley.
Id. at 48. The officers drove into the alley, and an officer got out of the car and asked
appellant "to identify himself and explain what he was doing there." Id. Appellant
refused to answer and was arrested for violating a statute that made it unlawful for a
person to refuse to give his name and address to an officer. Id Appellant was convicted
and appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
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On review, the high Court ruled that "[w]hen the officers detained appellant for the
purpose of requiring him to identify himself, they performed a seizure of his person
subject to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 50. The Court also ruled
that the seizure was unconstitutional, even for the limited purpose of determining why
appellant was in the alley. In that matter, the government's case failed where "none of
the circumstances preceding the officers' detention of appellant justified a reasonable
suspicion that he was involved in criminal conduct." Id. at 51-52.
In State v. Lopez. 783 P.2d 479, 481-82 (N.M. App. 1989) ("Lopez (N.M.V'\
defendant and a companion "were parked lawfully in a pickup on a dead-end street in
Albuquerque. Defendant's vehicle was parked facing away from the dead end. While
they were parked on the side of the road, not blocking traffic, a gray van carrying four
police detectives drove up and parked directly in front [of] and about a car length away
from the pickup. The van was angled in front of the pickup." Id. at 481. The detectives
got out of the van and approached the pickup. When they reached the passenger side, they
observed contraband on the truck seat. Id. at 481-82. Defendant was arrested, and
during pre-trial proceedings, the trial court suppressed the evidence. It determined that
the officers seized the defendant when they used their vehicle to block defendant in the
dead-end road. The appellate court agreed and affirmed the trial court's ruling. Id.
As in Lopez (N.M.), the deputies in this case drove up to Markland on a dead-end
road. Lopez (NM), 783 P.2d at 481-82. As in Brown, the deputies here approached
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Markland in an area of limited access, they got out of the car, and they asked Markland,
among other things, to "identify himself and explain what he was doing there." Brown,
443 U.S. at 48-49; (R. 111:6-9 (Spotten got out of the car, made contact with Markland,
and used authoritative tone); 79, Findings 8, 11, 14 (Spotten engaged in questioning); 51
(two deputies were present).) The Findings and the evidence support that the deputies
seized Markland from the start. (See R. 79, Conclusion 1); see also Ray, 2000 UT App
55, Tfl l(show of authority may support seizure); Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ffl|41-44
(officer's continued questioning constituted continued seizure).
Markland does not dispute that from the beginning, the deputies engaged in a
level-two seizure. Rather, Markland maintains the deputies were not justified in seizing
him. In that regard, this Court will assess whether the deputies articulated reasonable
suspicion to justify the detention. In this case, Spotten did not, as explained below.
2. The Trial Court Found Reasonable Suspicion for the Continued
Detention. Proper Application of the Law Fails to Support that Result.
In proceedings below, the state conceded that the deputies seized Markland. (R.
79, Conclusion 1.) Thus, the issue before this Court is whether the deputies had
reasonable suspicion to support the detention. In that regard, this Court will consider the
following: "(1) Was the police officer's action 'justified at its inception'? and (2) Was
the resulting detention 'reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the
interference in the first place?'" State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131-32 (Utah 1994)
("Lopez (UT)); Chapman. 921 P.2d at 450.
12

The state is required to prove that at all times the level-two detention was justified
by reasonable suspicion. See Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 786 (requiring officers to provide
sufficient evidence to justify conduct). If the state is unable to make that showing, "the
seizure violates the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution, and evidence
obtained as a result of the illegal seizure must be excluded." IJL In this case the state
failed to establish reasonable suspicion for the detention and warrants check.
a. The Deputies Failed to Identify Reasonable Suspicion to Justify the
Detention at Inception.
In order to justify a detention at inception, the "reasonable articulable suspicion"
test requires the police officer to point to specific, articulable facts to support that
defendant "has or is committing a crime" Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ^35 (emphasis added);
Lopez O m 873 P.2d at 1132; Trujillo, 739 P.2d at 88; Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15
(1999) ("A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when [the officer] has a
reasonable suspicion to believe [the person] has committed or is in the act of committing
or is attempting to commit a public offense and [the officer] may demand [the person's]
name, address and an explanation of his actions"). If an officer observes defendant
violate the law, or is able to articulate objective facts and reasonable inferences known to
the officer at the time of the stop to support a "reasonable suspicion" that defendant has
violated the law, that may be sufficient to justify a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
See Lopez (UT). 873 P.2d at 1132.
To determine "reasonable suspicion" of criminal activity in this case, this Court
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should start with the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (R. 78-80.)
According to the Findings, Spotten received information from dispatch regarding a cry
for help from the east part of the complex. (R. I l l :3; 78, Finding 1.) Deputy Spotten
considered the matter to be a "[k]ind of suspicious circumstance[s] call." (R. 44.)
Indeed, the cry reported by dispatch at 3:14 a.m. could have been anything,
including a cat, or someone crying in her sleep or because she fell and injured herself.
Nothing in the record supports the determination that the deputies had a suspicion of any
criminal activity when they first received the dispatched call, and in fact, Spotten did not
mention criminal suspicions in this matter.2 (See.R. 44, and record generally.)
Thus, the question here is whether the deputies made personal observations and
identified objective facts to support a reasonable suspicion that Markland was involved
in criminal activity. See Case, 884 P.2d at 1276-77. On that point, the record is silent.
(See record generally.) That is, the deputies here were simply investigating a purported
cry for help. (R. 111:3-4.) When they arrived at the east end of the complex, Spotten
saw Markland walking down the road. (R. I l l :6.) He did not see anything else. (R.
111:6, 8.) Spotten asked Markland if he heard anything in the area. Markland did not.

2 Normally, in assessing "reasonable suspicion," this Court will consider whether the
dispatcher's report to the officer provided "enough detail about the observed criminal
activity'' to support "reasonable suspicion." Kaysville City v. Mulcahv, 943 P.2d 231,
235-36 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (emphasis added); see also State v. Case. 884 P.2d 1274,
1277 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). In this case, since the dispatcher did not report "observed
criminal activity" that analysis is irrelevant.
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(R. I l l :7.)3 The deputies also observed and the trial court found that it was dark and late
at night, Markland was carrying two bags with him, and he would not be able to get
home via the gated/locked path at the dead-end. (R. 78-79, Findings 4, 6, 13; but see
supra, note 1, herein.) Those facts are insufficient to warrant the detention.
To explain, in State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, an officer was patrolling on State
Street at 3:30 in the morning in an area where several car prowls previously had been
reported. Trujillo, 739 P.2d at 86. The officer did not recall receiving any report of a
prowler that morning. IcL at 86. While in the area, the officer observed Trujillo and two
companions walking slowly along the street and peering into windows. The officer
stopped the car and continued to observe the trio. He specifically focused on a knapsack
that Trujillo carried. The officer believed Trujillo was trying to conceal the knapsack
when he shifted it around. "Officer Beesley did not see the trio violate any traffic
ordinances or engage in any criminal behavior." Trujillo, 739 P.2d at 86.
Nevertheless, the officer radioed for backup, pulled his car to the curb, and
approached the group. "Trujillo placed the knapsack next to a garbage can located on
the corner in what Officer Beesley regarded as an effort to 'stash it.'" IdL_ The officer

3 Even if the deputies were merely investigating the dispatched report, they were
required to articulate reasonable suspicion to justify detaining Markland. As this Court
has recognized, "[t]he search and seizure limitations of the fourth amendment apply to
'investigatory stops' or 'seizures' that fall short of official arrests." Trujillo, 739 P.2d at
87; see also, Lopez (N.M.), 783 P.2d at 482-483 (even where the state claimed the police
were merely investigating the matter, the court reiterated that for the limited detention,
the police were required to articulate reasonable suspicion that defendant broke the law).
15

asked the individuals "what they were doing, their names, and for identification." IdL_
They responded to Beesley's inquiries and Trujillo explained they were on their way to
his cousin's house. Beesley did not ask questions about the knapsack. When backup
arrived, Beesley took hold of Trujillo and told him to place his hands on the patrol car
and to spread his feet. Beesley then frisked Trujillo and discovered a weapon strapped to
his chest. Id Trujillo was arrested for possession of a weapon by a restricted person. IdL_
Prior to trial, the court denied Trujillo's motion to suppress the evidence, and then ultimately entered judgment against him. IdL Trujillo appealed the matter to this Court. kL
This Court ruled that the officer was not justified in detaining Trujillo. The Court
was not persuaded that the "lateness of the hour," the "high-crime factor in the area," and
the unidentified "suspicions" concerning the "knapsack" would support reasonable
suspicion that Trujillo was involved in criminal activity. IjLat 89-90. This Court
reversed the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress. Idj see also State v. Steward,
806 P.2d 213, 216 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (ruling that defendant's presence late at night in
a high crime cul-de-sac, with one entrance, did not give rise to a reasonable suspicion
that such person was involved in criminal activity).
The lessons of Trujillo apply here. In this case, Spotten failed to identify any
objective facts to support a reasonable suspicion that Markland was involved in criminal
activity. Rather, Spotten claimed he initially was suspicious because Markland was
walking in the road toward the area where the cries purportedly were heard. By
Spotten's admissions, he observed nothing in the area to relate to the alleged cries. (R.
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111:8.) Spotten also claimed he was suspicious because it was "3:00 in the morning, [it
was] dark outside," Markland was "in the back of a complex where he [did] not live," he
was at a "dead end" (R. I l l : 13), and he was carrying two bags. (See R. 79-80,
Conclusion 2.) Those additional facts do not support a reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity to justify the detention when the deputies stopped Markland.
As set forth in Trujillo, walking on the street late at night is not enough to support
a reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment. Trujillo, 739 P.2d at 89-90; see
also State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674, 675 (Utah 1986) (a slow moving car with out-ofstate plates in a neighborhood at 3:00 a.m. where a number of burglaries occurred, without more, may not support reasonable suspicion); State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718 (Utah
1985). And carrying a "suspicious" bag is not enough. Trujillo, 739 P.2d at 89-90.
With respect to the fact that Markland was walking through an area where he did
not live, Markland was truthful when he told Spotten he lived elsewhere and was trying
to get home. (See R. 111:10); see also Trujillo, 739 P.2d at 86 (defendant explained to
the officer that he was walking at 3:30 in the morning to his cousin's house). Also,
defendant's presence on the road late at night (even in a high crime area) "does not give
rise to a reasonable suspicion that such person is involved in criminal conduct." Steward,
806 P.2d at 216 (citing Brown. 443 U.S. 47).
While Spotten testified that he was "not sure exactly" how Markland would get
home "based on the dead end road" (R. 111:11) and/or based on the fact that the path
near the dead-end was gated and locked (R. 111:12; 49; see supra note 1, herein), that
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does not support reasonable suspicion. It simply supports that Spotten was "not sure
exactly" because he did not bother to ask Markland. (See,record in general.)
In State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991), an officer stopped a driver for
faulty brake lights. He requested identification from the driver and from the defendant
/passenger in the car. Id. at 762. The defendant/passenger did not have identification,
but gave the officer her name and date of birth. IcL_ The officer determined that neither
occupant owned the car, and he requested a registration, which they could not produce.
Id. Although the officer was not aware of a stolen vehicle matching the car's description, he thought the car might be stolen, and reasoned that under the circumstances, he
would conduct a warrants check on both persons. See id. at 762-64.
"The check revealed that the driver had a suspended driver's license and that defendant [passenger] had outstanding warrants." Id_at 762. The officer arrested defendant
and discovered paraphernalia during a search incident thereto. IdL. The defendant was
convicted and appealed. On certiorari review, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that the
warrants check constituted a seizure without reasonable suspicion. IcLat 764. With respect to the officer's concerns about a possibly stolen car, the court stated the following:
While the lack of a registration certificate and the fact that the occupants did not
own the car raised the possibility that the car might be stolen, this information,
without more, does not rise to the level of an articulable suspicion that the car was
stolen. As Judge Orme of the court of appeals stated in his dissent, the "facts are
just as consistent with the more likely scenario that the driver borrowed the car
from its rightful owner."
Johnson, 805 P.2d at 764 (cite omitted).
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The court in Johnson also ruled that the officer could have taken less intrusive
measures to resolve his concerns about the car. He "could have, but did not, exercise his
right to inquire about the registered owner and how the occupants came into possession
of the car." Icl at 764. A "satisfactory answer could have abated" the officer's
suspicions, and an "unsatisfactory answer could have heightened his suspicion and
justified further inquiry." Id. at 764. As it was, the officer's concerns about a stolen
vehicle constituted an unparticularized hunch. His concerns did not rise to the level of
reasonable suspicions to support the detention when the officer ran the warrants check on
the defendant/passenger. IdL; Trujillo, 739 P.2d at 89 (although the officer was
suspicious about the knapsack, he "never bothered to inquire" about it).
In this case, where Spotten was "not sure exactly" how Markland would get home
via the dead-end and/or the gated/locked path (R. 111:11-12), Spotten could have asked.
If Spotten had asked, he may have learned that Markland mistakenly believed the gate to
the path was opened; or Markland intended to go through the wooded area near the
basketball courts as a shortcut. (See.R. 111:4-5; supra, note 1, herein.) An answer of
that nature "could have abated [the deputy's] suspicion." Johnson, 805 P.2d at 764.
In fact, several innocent explanations support Markland's conduct, including the
following: (i) Markland mistakenly believed the path was opened and he could cut
through the complex onto the path going east; (ii) he believed the "blocked off road that
connected onto 45th South (R. 48-49) was accessible on foot (s_ee_ R. 79, Finding 12
(Markland was going home to 13th East and 45th South)); (iii) he thought he could walk
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around the gated and locked path through the wooded area to avoid walking the distance
around the complex (see R. 111:4-5 (Spotten described a "wooded area" near the
basketball courts on the side of the road), supra, note 1, herein); or (iv) he was lost.
Since Spotten did not bother to ask Markland about the matter, his suspicions were not
reasonable, and they failed to support that Markland was involved in criminal conduct.
To be clear, it is not a crime to walk on a dead-end street. If Markland mistakenly
believed he could take a short-cut or he was lost, there is nothing criminal about those
circumstances. In fact, in this case, the deputies did not claim there was anything
suspiciously criminal at all about the matter. (See record in general.)
Also, Spotten did not claim that Markland provided inconsistent or inappropriate
answers to his questions. While Spotten was "not sure exactly" how Markland would get
home from the road (R. 111:11), that does not justify the level-two detention. Johnson.,
805 P.2d at 764 (officer was not justified to detain defendant for a warrants check; he
could have asked about the car); Trujillo, 739 P.2d at 89 (officer was not justified in
detaining defendant; he never asked about the knapsack). The record in this case fails to
support a reasonable suspicion that Markland was involved in criminal activity. Thus,
the deputies were not justified in detaining Markland for the warrants check and the
related search.
b. Even if the State May Justify the Initial Detention, the Deputies Unlawfully
Exceeded the Scope When They ''Further Detainfed]" Marklandfor the
Warrants Check.
Markland maintains that the detention was not justified at inception. However, as20

suming arguendo the state may be able to justify the initial stop, this Court next must
consider whether the deputies exceeded the scope of the justification for the detention.
"[0]nce a stop is made, the detention '"must be temporary and last no longer than is
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop."'" Chapman, 921 P.2d at 452 (citing
Lopez OIF), 873 P.2d at 1132; Florida v. Rover. 460 U.S. 491 (1983)). The officers are
required to '"diligently [pursue] a means of investigation that [is] likely to confirm or
dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it [is] necessary to detain the
defendant.'" Lopez (UT\ 873 P.2d at 1132 (cites omitted).
Spotten testified that initially he was "suspicious" because Markland was in the
area where the cry for help supposedly was heard. (R. I l l : 12.) Spotten pulled up next to
Markland, got out of the car, and he "recounted" to Markland that he had received a
dispatch call of "a lady screaming for help[.] [Spotten] wanted to know if [Markland]
heard anything. [Markland] replied he had not." (R. I l l :7.) Spotten also testified that
he did not observe anything in the area. (R. I l l :8.)
Assuming arguendo the deputies were justified initially in detaining Markland,
once they learned he had no information about the cries and they saw nothing in the area,
their concerns as they related to the area were resolved. (R. 79, Findings 1, 6, 7, 9, 10.)
They were not entitled to further detain Markland. Indeed, in order to justify further
detention for "investigative questioning," the deputies were required to articulate
"reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity" as it related to Markland. Lopez
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(IJQ, 873 P.2d at 1132 (emphasis added); Chapman. 921 P.2d at 453.
To explain, in Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, Officer Rasmussen encountered defendant
and a woman parked on school property after hours apparently in violation of a city
loitering ordinance. Id. at 448. While Rasmussen ran a driver's license and warrants
check on defendant and the woman, Officer Ellertson heard the radio broadcast and
warned Rasmussen that defendant was a gang member and known to carry a gun. Id_
Ellertson joined Rasmussen at the school, and the two asked defendant to step out
of the car and place his hands on his head while they frisked him. The officers then
asked about weapons. IcL At some point during questioning defendant admitted he had a
gun under the front seat. The officers ultimately seized the gun and checked it. Since no
bullet was in the firing chamber, "its presence in the vehicle in that condition was
lawful." IdL at 448. The officers then ran an NCIC check on the gun and discovered it
was stolen. IdL at 449. Defendant was arrested for burglary and theft. IcL at 448.
The trial court refused to suppress the evidence and defendant filed a petition for
interlocutory review and a petition for certiorari review. IdL at 448. On review, the
supreme court ruled that if the officers were immediately aware of the weapon, they were
entitled to continue the investigation to ensure the safety of those present and/or to
ensure that the weapon was legally stored and transported. Id.at 453, 454.
However, once that determination was made, the officers had no reasonable,
articulable suspicion to justify running a check on the weapon to see if the weapon
had been stolen. By the officer's own testimony, no independent facts
surrounding the encounter with Chapman created suspicion that he was involved
in any illegal activity beyond violating the loitering ordinance. Therefore, the
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officers impermissibly expanded the scope of Chapman's detention when they ran
the additional check on the gun to determine its ownership.
14 at 453.
Under the Chapman analysis, if the deputies here were justified in detaining
Markland to investigate the alleged cries, after they observed nothing in the area and
learned that Markland heard nothing, they had no justification for further detaining him.
See Chapman, 921 P.2d at 452; Johnson, 805 P.2d at 763(both the length and scope of
the detention must be "'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances which rendered
its initiation permissible") (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20).
Yet, after Spotten resolved his concerns in the area about the purported cries, he
improperly "further detain[ed]" Markland (R. I l l :8) in two respects.
First, Spotten continued to question Markland. He asked Markland what he was
doing and he requested identification (R. I l l :9, 10). Based on this record, Markland
apparently provided appropriate answers to Spotten's questions. He identified himself,
provided identification, and told Spotten he was headed home. Spotten "thought he said
something like 1300 East" (R. I l l : 10), which would account for the fact that Markland
was in the east end of the complex. (R. I l l :3, 6.) Spotten also testified that he was "not
sure exactly" how Markland would get home based on the dead-end road. (R. 111:11.)
The additional questioning in this case exceeded the scope of the original
justification for the stop. Spotten failed to identify "reasonable suspicion of more serious
criminal activity" to support further detention for the additional investigative
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questioning. See Lopez (UT), 873 P.2d at 1132; (supra subpoint A.2. a.)
Next, after Spotten received answers to the additional questions, he went further
with the detention. He retained possession of Markland's identification and told Markland he "needed to run some checks," while a second deputy stood next to Markland. (R.
111:9; 51; 79, Findings 11-14.) Spotten's conduct further expanded the scope of the
detention without justification for the warrants check.
To be clear, if Spotten ran the check because he was "not sure exactly" how Markland would get home from the dead-end road (R. 111:11), that was improper. A warrants
check would not resolve that question for Spotten. See Lopez (UT), 873 P.2d at 1132
(the detention must be limited in scope and the officer must "diligently [pursue] a means
of investigation" that will "quickly resolve his suspicions). To quickly resolve his concerns, Spotten could have asked about the matter. As set forth above, supra pages 18-20,
Spotten may have learned that Markland was lost, or that Markland believed he could
access 45th South from the dead-end road. Plainly, the warrants check was not related to
ascertaining whether Markland could get home via the dead-end road, and it was not
strictly tied to the purpose for the stop. The deputies impermissibly expanded the scope
of the detention when they ran the computer check. See Chapman, 921 P.2d at 454.
Where the deputy retained possession of Markland's identification, Markland
remained detained. See U.S. v. Place. 462 U.S. 696, 708 n.8 (1983) (ruling that retention of property constitutes a seizure); Topanotes, 2000 UT App 311 (same); Ray, 2000
UT App 55. Where the deputy had no reason to detain Markland for the warrants check,
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the detention exceeded the scope of the justification for the stop, and was unlawful.
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 786. The search also was unlawful and cannot be upheld.
In this case, the trial court misapplied the law. An officer is not entitled to detain
a person simply because the officer has suspicious feelings about the person due to his
race, his mode of travel, the shoulder bag he is carrying, or the hour of the day. See
Brown, 443 U.S. at 52 (ruling that it was not enough that the "situation in the alley
'looked suspicious,"' where officer was unable to point to facts supporting criminal conduct); see also Trujillo, 739 P.2d at 89. "'Reasonable suspicion' does not equate with
'some' suspicion of wrongdoing." U.S. v. Wilson, 953 F.2d 116, 127 (4th Cir. 1991).
The officer's suspicions must be based in particularized, objective facts, and they
must support the defendant's involvement in criminal activity. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-21,
30. The suspicions in this case were insufficient to justify detaining Markland at any
point in the encounter. On this record, the trial court improperly applied the law. Since
Spotten ran the warrants check and arrested and searched Markland during an unlawful
detention, the search was invalid. See Trujillo, 739 P.2d at 90. Markland respectfully
requests that this Court reverse the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress.
3. Under Utah Law, an Officer Is Not Entitled to Detain a Person for a
Warrants Check Unless the Officer Is Able to Articulate Reasonable
Suspicion that the Person Is Involved in Criminal Conduct
In the event this Court is unable to identify the precise moment when the deputies
"detained" Markland for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, suffice it to say that when
the deputies retained possession of Markland's identification for the warrants check, that
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constituted a level-two seizure under the Fourth Amendment requiring the deputies to
articulate reasonable suspicion that Markland was involved in criminal activity.
See Place, 462 U.S. at 708 n.8 (ruling that retention of a person's property constitutes a
seizure); Topanotes, 2000 UT App 311 (same); Ray, 2000 UT App 55; State v. GodinaLuna, 826 P.2d 652, 655 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (finding that continued retention of
defendant's papers constituted a seizure). Where the deputy retained Markland's
property, a reasonable person in Markland's position would not feel free to leave. See
Ray, 2000 UT App 55, 1J13; see also supra subpoint A.I., above.
Utah courts have been willing to allow a detention for a computer check if it is in
connection with a lawful traffic stop and the officer is able to justify the check as it relates to the defendant. See e.g., Lopez (UT), 873 P.2d at 1132; see also State v. Higgins,
884 P.2d 1242, 1244-45 (Utah 1994) (defendant offered to drive car when driver was
arrested; defendant could not produce license, entitling officers to run computer/warrants
check as proper care-taking function); State v. Jackson, 805 P.2d 765, 769 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990) (defendant drove into a parking lot and confronted the officer, who followed
him; because defendant had just been driving, the officer requested a license, which
defendant claimed "had been taken;" the officer had reasonable suspicion to believe that
defendant was driving without a valid license, and ran the warrants checks).
And Utah courts have allowed a warrants check if it occurs during a seizure where
the officer has articulated a reasonable suspicion that defendant has committed a crime.
See State v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984, 985, 988 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (officer stopped
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pedestrian at 2:05 a.m. when he noticed pedestrian's youth and possible curfew violation;
during initial encounter, officer detected the smell of alcohol on youth's breath which
supported reasonable suspicion for level-two seizure; officer requested identification and
ran warrants check); Bountiful City v. Maestas, 788 P.2d 1062 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)
(officer responded to intoxication report and contacted defendant in the driver's seat;
officer smelled alcohol on defendant's breath supporting reasonable articulable suspicion
for warrants check); Smoot 921 P.2d at 1006-07 (officers suspected defendant was
involved in recent robberies; although matter began as level-one encounter "it is not
critical to pinpoint the precise moment" when defendant was seized since officers had a
right to detain defendant due to their initial suspicions).
Utah courts have declined to uphold an officer's conduct in detaining a person for
a warrants check absent reasonable suspicion. See Johnson, 805 P.2d at 764; Chapman,
921 P.2d at 453 (recognizing that a warrants check on a passenger in a vehicle lawfully
stopped "exceeded the appropriate scope of detention"); State v. Hansen, 837 P.2d 987,
988-89 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
In Salt Lake City v. Rav, 2000 UT App 55, 998 P.2d 274, defendant made a
purchase at a convenience store then stood outside the store to wait for a ride. She
waited outside for two hours before the store manager became uneasy and called police.
Ray, 2000 UT App 55, ^[2. According to the record, the defendant was not causing
problems in front of the store, she was not asked to leave, and no one reported suspicions
that she was engaged in any illegal activity. IdL at ^|2. Nevertheless, when officers
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arrived, they approached Ray and began to question her about her presence at the store.
IcL at 14. Ray told officers she had made a purchase at the store and was waiting for a
ride to work. "When asked how long she had been waiting, Ray responded that she had
been there approximately thirty minutes. However, when [the officer] poked his head
back in the door, the manager stated that she had been there about two hours." kLat 14.
Ray apparently later corrected herself and said she had been waiting for two hours. Id.
According to the officer, Ray appeared to be nervous, she talked fast and she
"repeatedly shifted her weight from one foot to the other." IcL at 115. Ray's conduct
piqued the officers' interest and they asked for her identification, which she produced.
IdL at 15. "Rather than viewing the information and returning the card, Officer Eldard
retained Ray's identification and stepped off to the side and away from Ray to check for
warrants on his portable radio. The warrant check took approximately five minutes and
revealed no outstanding warrants." Id. at 15. Meanwhile a second officer obtained
consent to search Ray's bag and discovered drug paraphernalia. IcL_at ^|6. Ray was
charged, and she challenged the search below and on appeal.
In considering the matter, this Court ruled that Ray was seized at the point when
the officer obtained her identification and retained it for the warrants check. IcLat 111317. The Court also ruled that on the facts of the case, "it is clear there was no reasonable
articulable suspicion supporting the seizure." Id^at 119. It stated the following:
First, the facts known to the officers regarding Ray were at least as consistent with
lawful behavior as with the commission of a crime. The testimony of Officers
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Eldard and Jones resolves the question. By their own testimony. Officers Eldard
and Jones had no knowledge of any violation of the law that Ray might have
committed or was about to commit. Accordingly, there is no basis on which to
justify the level two stop, and the seizure, therefore, violated Ray's rights under the
Fourth Amendment.
Id. at Tf 19 (notes omitted). The Court was not persuaded that Ray's statement to officers
that she had been waiting 30 minutes supported reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
The lessons of Ray apply here. Although Spotten referred to the dispatch call in
this matter as a "[k]ind of suspicious circumstance[s] call" (R. 44), there is no indication
here that anyone "had engaged in any illegal activity." Ray, 2000 UT App 55, %2
(see record in general). When the deputies arrived in the area, they observed Markland
walking. At that point, they "had no knowledge of any violation of the law that [the
defendant] might have committed or was about to commit." Ray, 2000 UT App 55, ^19
(see record in general). Nevertheless, two uniformed deputies, "with badge, gun, the
whole works," Ray, 2000 UT App 55, Tf 13, confronted Markland. (R. 111:7 (Spotten did
not pull his weapon; he was in a marked patrol car).)
After Spotten determined that Markland had not heard anything in the area (R.
111:7-8), Spotten "further detained" Markland (R. 111:8-9) and asked for identification.
(R. I l l :9.) When Spotten obtained the identification, "he did not view the information
and return" the card to Markland. Ray, 2000 UT App 55, «[[13. Rather, he kept it and
informed Markland that he "needed to run some checks." (R. I l l :9); see State v. Barnes.
978 P.2d 1131, 1135 (Wash. App. 1999) (use of authoritative language supports
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detention). Spotten did not identify anything unusual about the card. (See R. 111:9.)
Spotten then stepped away to use his "radio to check for outstanding warrants," Ray, 2000
UT 55, ^fl3, while a second deputy continued to stand with Markland. (R. 51.) Spotten
had a response back in less than five minutes. See Ray, 2000 UT App 55, ^f 13 (check
took 5 minutes); (R. I l l :9). He continued to retain possession of Markland's card.
The facts in this case support that at least at the point where the deputies retained
control over Markland's identification, Markland was detained without justification. The
facts known to the deputies regarding Markland were consistent with lawful behavior.
There is no indication that Markland was engaged in illegal activity. Also, Spotten did
not testify that he had any knowledge to support that Markland might have violated any
law. Nevertheless, Spotten retained possession of Markland's identification, thereby
ensuring his control over Markland. See Place, 462 U.S. at 708 n.8 (ruling that retention
of a person's property constitutes a seizure); Topanotes, 2000 UT App 311 (same);
Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d at 655 (finding that continued retention of defendant's papers
constituted a seizure). Where the record fails to support reasonable suspicion for the
warrants check, "there is no basis on which to justify the level two stop," and the seizure
in this case violated defendant's "rights under the Fourth Amendment." Ray, 2000 UT
App 55, Tfl9. Since the deputies searched Markland during the unlawful detention, the
evidence they discovered must be suppressed. Id.
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B. MARKLAND IS ENTITLED TO SUPPRESSION OF THE EVIDENCE
SINCE THE ARREST OCCURRED DURING THE UNLAWFUL LEVELTWO DETENTION.
Pursuant to Utah law, "[i]f a seizure occurs and the police are unable to point to
the specific and articulable facts that justified that seizure, the seizure violates the fourth
amendment of the United States Constitution, and evidence obtained as a result of the
illegal seizure must be excluded." Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 786;4 see Ray, 2000 UT App
55, Tf20 (where the officers searched the bag in connection with the unlawful level-two
detention, the search was illegal); Swanigan, 699 P.2d at 719 (where detention was
unlawful, search could not be upheld and confiscated evidence was erroneously admitted
at trial); Johnson, 805 P.2d at 764 (detention was unlawful "and evidence obtained
pursuant to the arrest" was suppressed); Hansen, 837 P.2d at 989 (defendant was unlawfully seized when officers ran warrants check; matter remanded for proceedings consistent with opinion); Trujillo, 739 P.2d at 90 (where seizure was unlawful, officer "had no
right" to conduct the pat-down search; the evidence should have been suppressed);
Lopez (NMX 783 P.2d at 483; U.S. v. Luckett, 484 F.2d 89, 91 (9th Cir. 1973).
In this case, the deputies' engaged in an unlawful level-two detention. (See supra

4
Since the search occurred as a direct result of the unlawful level-two detention, the
exclusionary rule applies. The evidence obtained pursuant to the arrest must be
suppressed. Johnson, 804 P.2d at 764.
This is not a case where "intervening circumstances" existed, which would require
application of the "exploitation analysis." See Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ffif62-64
(recognizing application of "exploitation analysis" when a prior illegality poisons a
subsequent consent for a search).
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subpoint A., above.) The unlawful detention occurred where deputies failed to identify
objective facts to support reasonable suspicion that Markland was involved in criminal
activity. (See supra subpoints A.2. and A.3., above.) During the unlawful detention, the
deputies conducted a warrants check, arrested Markland, and searched him. Since the
detention was unlawful, the deputies had no right to conduct the warrants check, and the
arrest and the search incident thereto were unlawful. Trujillo, 739 P.2d at 90; Johnson,
805 P.2d at 764. The deputies discovered the evidence in this case as a direct result of the
unlawful, level-two seizure. The evidence is inadmissible at trial. Markland respectfully
requests that this Court reverse the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress.
CONCLUSION
The deputies' encounter with Markland constituted an unlawful, level-two
detention where the deputies failed to articulate reasonable suspicion that Markland was
involved in criminal activity. The detention violated Markland's Fourth Amendment
right and rendered the arrest and search, in connection therewith, unlawful. The trial
court erred in denying the motion to suppress evidence obtained in connection with the
unlawful seizure. Markland respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court's
ruling and remand the case for dismissal.
SUBMITTED this rftiay of

SUA^J^T

2003.

uJfNDA M.JONES

J

NISA SISNEROS
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
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copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State,

5th Floor, 140230, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230 and V copies to the Attorney
General's Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P.O. Box
140854, this if**- day of

^^U-S^A^,

2003.

Linda M. Jones
DELIVERED to the Utah Attorney General's Office and the Utah Court of
Appeals Court as indicated above this

day of
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

DAVID E. YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
MICHAELA D. ANDRUZZI, 7804
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW

Plaintiff,
-vs-

Case No. 011906683
DAVID ROGER MARKLAND,
Hon. William W. Barrett
Defendant.
Defendant's Motion to Suppress came before this Court for hearing in the above entitled
matter on September 10, 2002. Defendant was represented by counsel, Nisa Sisneros, and the
State was represented by counsel, Michaela D. Andruzzi. The Court having read memoranda
submitted by counsel, and considered arguments of counsel, hereby enters its FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. On April 30, 2001, at 3:14 am, Deputy Edward Spotten (Hereinafter Deputy Spotten)
received a dispatch to that informed him that someone was crying out for help in the east part
of the apartment complex on Bridgeside Landing which has its entrance on Sunstone Road at
500 West.
2. The road that runs through the eastern part of the apartment complex ends in a dead-end.
3. At the dead-end there is a basketball court, a bike path that was gated and locked at the time,
and the Jordan river.
4. There was no lighting at that end of the road.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Case No. 011906683
Page 2

5. Deputy Spotten arrived at the apartment complex within 5 minutes.
6. Upon arriving at the eastern part of the complex, Deputy Spotten saw the defendant, David
Roger Markland, walking towards the dead-end of the road carrying two bags.
7. Deputy Spotten did not see anyone else in the area.
8. Deputy Spotten pulled up next to the defendant and asked him his name.
9. Deputy Spotten told him that he received a report of screams for help in that area and asked
the defendant if he had heard anything.
10. The defendant responded that he had not heard anything.
11. Deputy Spotten asked the defendant where he was going.
12. The defendant responded that he was going home to 13th East and 45th South.
13. There was no way for the defendant to get home walking in the direction he was headed
when Deputy Spotten stopped him.
14. Deputy Spotten then asked the defendant for identification and told him he was going to
check for warrants.
15. There was a warrant for the defendant and deputy Spotten arrested the defendant.
16. The subsequent search incident to arrest yieled marijuana, methamphetamine, and drug
paraphernalia.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The State concedes that the stop was a level-two stop requiring reasonable articulable
suspicion.
2. The Court finds that Deputy Spotten had a reasonable articulable based on the following five
factors:
a) The deputy received a report that someone was crying for help five minutes earlier in
the area where he found the defendant.
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b) It was late at night and the area was not well lit.
c) The defendant was headed down a dead-end road where he could not get anywhere.
d) The defendant said he was going home to a location that he could not get to by
traveling in the direction in which he was headed.
e) The defendant was carrying two bags with him.
ORDER
Based upon the foregoing facts and conclusions the Court enters the following order:
Defendant Markland's motion to suppress is denied.
DATED this Cp

day of October, 2002.

Approved as^te form:

NiW Sisneros
BY Tjffi COURT:

Honorable William W. Barrett
Third District Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings Of Fact And
Conclusions Of Law was delivered to Nisa Sisneros, Attorney for Defendant David Roger
Markland, at 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on the 2- day of
September, 2002.
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ADDENDUM B

FILED
Utah Court of Appeals

DEC 1 7 2002
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

Paulette Stagg
Clerk of the Court

ooOoo
State of Utah,
ORDER
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No. 20020965-CA
v.

f ILEB DISTRICT

David Roger Markland,

Third Judicial District

Jtfl C 8 2003

Defendant and Petitioner.
B»-,

•——,-*~—~~~

Deputy Clerk

Before Judges Davis, Greenwood, and Orme
This matter is before the court on a petition for permission
to appeal from an interlocutory order filed pursuant to Rule 5 of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for permission to
appeal is granted. This court will notify the parties upon
setting a briefing schedule.
Dated this

H

day of December, 2002.

FOR THE COURT:

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on December 17, 2002, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States
mail to the parties listed below:

BRETT J. DELPORTO
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 E 300 S 6TH FL
PO BOX 140854
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854
NISA J. SISNEROS
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 E 500 S STE 300
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111

D a t e d t h i s December 17, 2002

By rh j JQ/XJ ( g v A L l / x a
Deputy Clerk
Case No. 20020965

ADDENDUM C

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMENDMENT IV
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.

